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SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #5867
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6661
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 334-2712
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
JAE HO JUNG,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 42137
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2013-2622
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In two cases consolidated in the district court, a jury found Jae Ho Jung guilty of
two counts of possession of a synthetic cannabinoid with the intent to deliver, guilty of
one count of possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to deliver, and failed to
reach a verdict on another count of possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to
deliver.1 Mr. Jung asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing to act

Mr. Jung’s Notice of Appeal contained only one of the district court case numbers (CR2013-2622); therefore, he only asserts error in the district court’s decisions relating to
his sentence for one count of possession of synthetic cannabinoids with the intent to
deliver. Mr. Jung has filed a post-conviction petition in his other case (CR-2013-7755),
in the hope that he will regain his right to appeal the district court’s sentencing decisions
in that case as well.
1
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consistently with the applicable law, when the court denied Mr. Jung’s request for a
withheld judgment.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Acting on information from patrol and bicycle officers suggesting that synthetic
cannabinoids were being sold in the Jay Mart, a gas station and convenience store
located at 16th and State Street in Boise, Detective Andreoli of the Boise Police
Department went undercover in an attempt to purchase some but he was told by the
clerk that the Jay Mart does not sell those substances. (Tr. Trial, p.243, L.17 – p.245,
L.4.)2 Presumably due to a lack of probable cause to obtain a search warrant, Detective
Andreoli contacted detectives with the Idaho State Police Alcohol Beverage Control who
agreed to do a premises check purportedly to ensure that the Jay Mart was complying
with regulations regarding the sale of alcohol. (Tr. Trial, p.246, L24 – p.247, L.11.) On
October 25, 2012, law enforcement personnel searched the Jay Mart, found 15 packets
labeled “Holy Grail” potpourri which contained synthetic cannabinoids, found pipes,
grinders, and other drug paraphernalia, and detained the owner, Jae Jung. (Tr. Trial,
p.331, L.9 – p.332, L.7; p.341, L.5 – p.361, L.2.) Detective Andreoli asked Mr. Jung, a
lawful permanent resident born in South Korea (PSI, pp.6-7)3, about the synthetic
cannabinoids and Mr. Jung responded, in a thick accent, that a white male had dropped
them off about a week earlier asking him to hand them out as samples, but he had not
sold or given any away.

(Tr. Trial, p.453, L.18 – p.455, L.7.) Officers seized the

The bulk of the trial proceedings are contained in the 1,033 page transcript created for
this appeal and will be cited as “Tr. Trial” in this Brief.
3 Citations to materials contained in the Presentence Investigation Report will include
the page numbers associated with the electronic file containing those materials.
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synthetic cannabinoids and some items they considered to be drug paraphernalia and
Detective Andreoli told Mr. Jung that the items he had were illegal to sell, but they did
not arrest him at that time. (Tr. Trial, p.455, L.8 – p.457, L.18; p.563, L.16 – p.565, L.1.)
Although a warrant was issued for Mr. Jung’s arrest on February 26, 2013, he
was not arrested until four months later when informants told detectives that Mr. Jung
was selling synthetic cannabinoids in the Jay Mart.

(R., pp.11-13, PSI, p.83.)

Detectives again entered the Jay Mart, found more pipes and other purported drug
paraphernalia being sold, arrested Mr. Jung, and found 8 packets of synthetic
cannabinoids labeled “Krooked Original” on Mr. Jung’s person and within popcorn and
hot dog bags. (Tr., p.462, L.5 – p.505, L.21.) After being made aware of his right to
remain silent, Mr. Jung voluntarily spoke with Detective Andreoli and answered every
question asked of him. (Tr. Trial, p.506, L.22 – p.519, L.24; Exs. 17, 18.) Mr. Jung
stated that a man who called himself “Noah” delivered the synthetic cannabinoids to
him, describing him as tall and skinny and always wearing glasses. (Ex. 18.) “Noah”
told him that selling the “fake marijuana” was legal in Idaho because selling real
marijuana was legal in Washington and Colorado, and that other stores around Boise
sold the same products. (Ex. 18.) Mr. Jung admitted, however, that he did not sell the
synthetic cannabinoids out in the open, only sold it to people he trusted, and did not tell
his employees that he was selling the product because he was “scared.” (Ex. 18.)
Mr. Jung told Detective Andreoli how much he bought the product for, how much he
sold it for, and how often he sold it. (Ex. 18.) Mr. Jung was shown a picture of an
individual and asked if it was “Noah”; however, Mr. Jung was unable to say one way or
the other whether the person pictured was the person he knew was “Noah.” (Ex. 18.)
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A jury found Mr. Jung guilty of possession of a synthetic cannabinoid with the
intent to deliver related to his possession of “Holy Grail” on October 25, 2012, but the
jury could not reach a verdict related to the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia
with the intent to deliver on that same date.4

(R., p.180.)

During the sentencing

hearing, counsel for Mr. Jung requested that the court withhold judgment and place
Mr. Jung on probation. (Tr. Sent, p.29, L.17 – p.30, L.4.) The district court indicated
that it believed that Mr. Jung meets two of the requirements necessary for the court to
withhold judgment pursuant to I.C. § 37-2738(4) – that he has no prior finding of guilt to
any drug related crimes, and the court has an abiding conviction that he will
successfully complete the terms of his probation; however, the court felt that it “cannot
find that the defendant meets criteria (c), that the defendant satisfactorily cooperated
with law enforcement authorities in the prosecution of drug related crimes of which the
defendant had previously been involved.” (Tr. Sent, p.30, L.11 – p.31, L.6; p.33, L.19 –
p.34, L.22.) The district court sentenced Mr. Jung to a unified term of five years, with
two years fixed, and placed him on probation for a period of five years, to run
concurrently with the suspended sentences in his companion case.5 (R., pp.187-194.)

The jury found Mr. Jung guilty of both possession of a synthetic cannabinoid with the
intent to deliver and possession of paraphernalia with the intent to deliver, stemming
from his arrest on April 25, 2013. (R., p.118.)
5 In the companion case, the district court sentenced Mr. Jung to concurrent terms of six
years, with two and one-half years fixed for possession of synthetic cannabinoids with
the intent to deliver, and five years, with two years fixed, for possession of
paraphernalia with the intent to deliver. (Tr., p.35, L.1 – p.36, L.10.)
4
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Mr. Jung filed a timely Notice of Appeal in case number CR-2013-2622. (R., pp.183184.)6
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by failing to enter a withheld judgment?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Enter A Withheld Judgment
Sentencing decisions are reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion
standard. When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court rightly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to
specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of
reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). Mr. Jung asserts that the district
court’s decision to deny his request for a withheld judgment was based upon a faulty
understanding of the applicable legal standards.
Idaho Code § 37-2738 reads, in relevant part, as follows,
(1) Any person who pleads guilty to, is found guilty of or has a
judgment of conviction entered upon a violation of the provisions of
subsection (a), (b), (c) or (e) of section 37-2732, Idaho Code, shall be
sentenced according to the criteria set forth herein.
…
(4) When sentencing an individual for the crimes enumerated in section
(1) of this section, the court shall not enter a withheld judgment unless it
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that:
The Notice of Appeal was filed after the district court orally pronounced sentence but
prior to the court entering its written judgment and was, therefore, timely filed pursuant
to Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e)(2).
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(a) The defendant has no prior finding of guilt for any felony, any
violation of chapter 80, title 18, Idaho Code, or subsection
(a),(b), (c) or (e) of section 37-2732, Idaho Code, whatsoever; and
(b) The sentencing court has an abiding conviction that the
defendant will successfully complete the terms of probation; and
(c) The defendant has satisfactorily cooperated with law
enforcement authorities in the prosecution of drug related crimes of
which the defendant has previously had involvement.
I.C. § 37-2738. The jury found Mr. Jung was guilty of violating Idaho Code § 37-2732(a)
by possessing a non-narcotic schedule I controlled substance (synthetic cannabinoid)
with the intent to deliver. Therefore, in order to be eligible for a withheld judgment, all
three of the criteria enumerated in I.C. § 37-2738(4) must be met.
The district court correctly found that Mr. Jung had no prior convictions for any of
the offenses listed in subsection (a); in fact, Mr. Jung had no prior criminal history
whatsoever. (Tr. Sent, p.30, Ls.7-19; PSI, pp.5-6.) Furthermore, the district court’s
finding that it had an “abiding conviction that the defendant will successfully complete
the terms of his probation” is well supported. (Tr. Sent, p.30, Ls.20-22.) Mr. Jung
repeatedly apologized for his behavior and expressed nothing more than a desire to
stay in the United States so that his wife could continue get the best possible treatment
for her cancer, and that his two sons (the younger of whom is an American citizen)
would be able to continue to grow up in the only country they knew. (Tr. Sent, p.32,
L.15 – p.33, L.2; Ex. 18, PSI, pp.6-9, 13-16.) The court’s finding is further supported by
the fifteen different letters submitted in support of Mr. Jung by people attesting to his
character, including the fact that he often times would allow the homeless to come into
his store just to get warm during the freezing winter months, and that he would provide
those in need with free food and drink. (PSI, pp.115-129.)
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Mr. Jung asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing to find that
he met the third criteria. The court appeared concerned that there was a lack of a
factual basis for the court to conclude that Mr. Jung “has satisfactorily cooperated with
law enforcement authorities in the prosecution of drug related crimes of which the
defendant has previously had involvement.” (Tr. Sent, p.30, L.22 – p.31, L.6; p.34,
Ls.8-16 (quoting I.C. § 37-2738(4)(c).)) It is not entirely clear whether the district court
felt that there was no factual basis to conclude that Mr. Jung cooperated with law
enforcement in the present case, or whether the court felt that Mr. Jung had to have
previously been involved in drug related crimes for which he satisfactorily cooperated in
the prosecution of. In either case, the district court abused its discretion.
The Idaho Legislature has provided instructions on how to interpret laws it has
enacted.
(1) The language of a statute should be given its plain, usual and ordinary
meaning. Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the expressed intent
of the legislature shall be given effect without engaging in statutory
construction. The literal words of a statute are the best guide to
determining legislative intent.
(2) If a statute is capable of more than one (1) conflicting construction, the
reasonableness of the proposed interpretations shall be considered, and
the statute must be construed as a whole. Interpretations which would
render the statute a nullity, or which would lead to absurd results, are
disfavored.
(3) Words and phrases are construed according to the context and the
approved usage of the language, but technical words and phrases, and
such others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law,
or are defined in the succeeding section, are to be construed according to
such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.
I.C. § 73-113. Mr. Jung asserts that I.C. § 37-2738(4)(c) is capable of more than one
conflicting interpretation: 1) that the defendant’s ability to get a withheld judgment
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depends upon the defendant having prior involvement in drug related crimes for which
he satisfactorily cooperated in the prosecution of; 2) that the cooperation requirement
applies only where law enforcement first asks the defendant to cooperate, i.e. that this
provision will not bar a defendant from obtaining a withheld judgment unless law
enforcement first asks the defendant to cooperation; or 3) that the cooperation
requirement applies to the investigation leading to the charge brought in the case for
which the defendant is being sentenced.
The first of these interpretations of this provision would lead to absurd results. If
a defendant’s eligibility to obtain a withheld judgment depends upon having prior
involvement in drug related crimes, a defendant who simply had no such prior
involvement would not be eligible for a withheld judgment and would suffer more
draconian, rather than more lenient treatment. Idaho law, however, recognizes that the
first offender should be granted more lenient treatment than those individuals who have
engaged in repeated criminal activities.

See State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673

(1998). Additionally, reading this provision to require the defendant to cooperate with
law enforcement leaves a defendant’s ability to obtain a withheld judgment to the
discretion of law enforcement, i.e., if the police choose not to ask the defendant to
cooperate, the defendant would have no ability to meet this provision. Such a reading,
however, would allow the executive branch to, in effect, exercise the power reserved
only to the legislature to limit the inherent power of a sentencing court to exercise
sentencing discretion. See State v. Branson, 128 Idaho 790 (1996). Thus, to the extent
that the district court read I.C. § 37-2738(4)(c) as allowing for a withheld judgment only
where a defendant had a prior history of drug related crimes, law enforcement asked
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the defendant to cooperate in the prosecution of such crimes, and the defendant
satisfactorily met this obligation, the district court’s reading is incorrect and the court
abused its discretion in denying Mr. Jung a withheld judgment by failing to apply the
applicable legal standards.
Mr. Jung asserts that the most reasonable interpretation of I.C. § 37-2738(4)(c),
is one that recognizes that the defendant must first be given an opportunity to cooperate
with law enforcement in the prosecution of drug related crimes for which the defendant
has been involved in. In other words, where defendants like Mr. Jung have no prior
involvement in drug related crimes, or where defendants with prior involvement in drug
related crimes are never asked to cooperate in any prosecution related to those crimes,
this provision would automatically be met. Such an interpretation is consistent with the
axiom that first time offenders should be granted more lenient treatment than those who
repeatedly violate the law, and that a court’s authority to exercise sentencing discretion
is not limited by the whims of narcotics detectives.
Finally, to the extent that this Court determines that I.C. § 37-2738(4)(c) requires
a defendant to cooperate with law enforcement in the case for which the defendant is
being sentenced in order to be eligible for a withheld judgment, Mr. Jung met that
requirement in the present case. Simply put, Mr. Jung answered every question that
law enforcement ever asked of him. He identified his source by name and gave a
physical description, and he identified how the transactions occurred including how
much he bought the synthetic cannabinoids for, how much he sold it for, and how often
he sold it. (Ex. 18.) He was shown a picture of someone who Detective Andreoli
presumably suspected may have been “Noah” but he was unable to identify the person

9

because “Noah” always wore sunglasses, and because of the inherent problems of
cross-cultural identification.7 (Ex. 18.) Law enforcement did not ask him to become a
confidential informant or otherwise cooperate in the prosecution of anyone else.
Therefore, Mr. Jung met the all of the requirements set forth in I.C. § 37-2738(4)(c), and
the district court abused its discretion by failing to grant his request for a withheld
judgment.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Jung respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction
and remand his case to the district court with instructions that the court withhold
judgment while Mr. Jung serves his probationary term.
DATED this 15th day of September, 2015.

___________/s/______________
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

Mr. Jung told Detective Andreoli that when he first approached him, Mr. Jung actually
thought that Detective Andreoli was “Noah” and he also stated that white people look
the same to him, which is not unexpected. See State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 594
fn. 8 (2011) (citing State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 27 A.3d 872, 907 (2011)).

7
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of September, 2015, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
JAE HO JUNG
5538 SOUTH FLAX PLACE
BOISE ID 83716
MICHAEL E WETHERELL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
DAVID LEROY
ATTORNEY AT LAW
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF
__________/s/_______________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
JCP/eas

11

